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'must have' provision in this type of debt instrument. Then, pari passu clauses stayed in unsecured debt instruments due to the fear of the earmarking revenues, or the risk of the sovereign, preferring a group of creditors over another. 4 These two fears were tackled by an expanded negative pledge clause and the Libra Bank Limited v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica S.A. 5 and Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agrícola de Cartago 6 cases. Therefore, if a proper due diligence was conducted; there was no need to have a pari passu clause unless there was an exceptional circumstance, like the ones of Spain or the Philippines. Unfortunately, a misguided interpretation of the pari passu clause in the Elliot Associates LP v. Banco de la Nación y República del Perú case 7 opened the door to litigation on incorrect grounds, which mainly focused on payment interpretation or broad interpretation of the pari passu clause. 8 It was an 'aberration', but one that caused furor. 9 In Elliot, there was no breach of the pari passu clause, but rather a wrong understanding of its meaning. In the case of Argentina, the whole story could be different since it can be correctly interpreted as a breach of the pari passu clause in its ranking or narrow form. This article will focus on the recent Argentine sovereign debt restructuring exercise that might re-ignite litigation based on the pari passu clause. It is important to stress the difference between the two scenarios, i.e. litigation pre and post Argentina's sovereign debt exchange offer. Pre-Argentina's litigation was based on an incorrect interpretation of the pari passu clause made by a Belgium court. Post-Argentina's potential litigation could be based on an sovereign debt bond instruments. Buchheit and Pam also consider Argentina a country that forced the inclusion of the pari passu clause since 1972, when they reenacted a practice dating back to 1862 where foreign creditors were subordinated to local creditors in the bankruptcy of an Argentine debtor. See Buchheit On December 23, 2001 , in an ill-famed assembly, the Argentine Congress gave the President of the nation a standing ovation when he announced a moratorium on the Argentine sovereign debt. The message given to the international investors who had decided to invest in Argentine debt securities, however, was far from respectful to the rule of law. A 38.4 percent of the defaulted debt was held by individuals and corporations domiciled in Argentina, while the rest was scattered throughout the world. 11 To overcome the default status, Presidential Decree 1735/04 12 ordered the restructuring of two Argentine securities, first, debt instrumented in the form of bonds, and second, payment of which had been deferred under the provisions of Article 59 of Argentine Law No. 25,827. 13 The restructuring was carried out through a domestic and international exchange of sovereign debt bonds for new securities. The domestic exchange offer comprised three phases: 1) local debt, 14 2) debt of political subdivisions, and 3) and the international exchange offer.
On January 13, 2005,-after thirty-six months in default-Argentina released, by means of Resolution 20/05 (issued by the Ministry of Economy), the final offering prospectus and supplement, including the terms 10. It is recommended that the two parts should be read as a whole, they each can be accessed through Westlaw and Lexis Nexis. Nov. 26, 2003) . A Spanish version is available at http:// www.infoleg.gov.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/90000-94999/91229/texact.htm. 14. It was referred to as 'local debt' because either the creditors were: (1) Entities registered in Argentina or Argentine residents; or (2) that the place of payment was located within the Argentine territory. According to § 58 of Argentine Law No. 24,156, public debt can be classified into internal and external debt as well as direct and indirect debt. Internal debt is the debt owed to persons or legal entities that reside or are registered within the territory of the Republic of Argentina and that its payment can be claimed within the same territory. On the other hand, external debt is the debt owed to another State, international institutions or persons or legal entities that do not reside or are not registered within the territory of the Republic of Argentina and that its payment can be claimed throughout the territory of the Republic of Argentina. Direct public debt is the debt incurred directly by the National Government as principal debtor. Indirect public debt is any debt incurred by any person or entity-be it private or public-different from the National Government but that the latter guarantees.
and conditions of the exchange offer. The exchange was implemented between January 14 and February 25, 2005, and obtained an acceptance of 76.17 percent of the total eligible amount (approximately US$ 62,300 million). Argentina-inexplicably, in comparison to other default experiences in the 1990s 15 -stayed in a default situation for over three years before concluding its exchange offer. The Republic of Argentina exchanged 152 series of bonds, governed by the laws of eight different countries, for an aggregate eligible amount (representing par value plus accrued and unpaid interest) of approximately US$ 81,800 million, 16 into a total of eleven series of Par Bonds, Quasi Par Bonds and Discount Bonds and five series of GDP Linked Units. 17 This sovereign default has certain particular characteristics. For one, it is the biggest default ever, in terms of monetary amounts and number of creditors (over 700,000). Moreover, it has other complex characteristics:
(1) eight applicable laws; (2) the geographical distribution of creditors; (3) the longest time elapsed before curing the default (thirty-seven months); and, (4) a reduction in the acceptance percentage threshold (from over ninety percent to 76.17%).
With regards to the first issue, Argentina defaulted on approximately 81,800 million US$ of debt obligations, while the second biggest bond defaulter was Russia in 1998 with 31.6 billion US$. Argentina's default is 66.7% greater. Also, more than 700,000 creditors atomized within the international financial community. 18 The creditor's base in sovereign debt episodes has been enlarged as the result of the Brady Plan, which replaced sovereign syndicated loans with bonds. While syndicated loans were held by a small group of banks, the bonds ended up being sold in the secondary market to thousands of creditors. Due to the recurrent need for external financing, Argentina's push for the atomization of creditors that resulted from a bond issuance, was taken to an extreme. According to official data, institutional investors held fifty-six percent of the eligible restructured debt, while the remaining forty-four percent is held 15. The longest default duration during the 1990s was the 1998 Russian default which lasted eighteen months, followed by the 1999 Ecuadorian default which lasted ten months. Furthermore, there were 152 different series of bonds, with eight different governing laws: fifty-one percent of Argentine debt was subject to New York law, eighteen percent to English Law, seventeen percent to German law, eleven percent to Argentine law, two percent to Japanese law, and the remaining one percent to Italian, Spanish, and Swiss law. 20 The jurisdictions under which the debt instruments have been issued provide a good indication of which is the target market. This leads to the issue of geographical distribution of creditors. Almost forty percent of Argentine defaulted debt is held by Argentinean bondholders, and the remaining sixty percent is distributed in at least eight countries: Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 21 Whether Argentina's situation, vis-à-vis holdouts, would have been different had the exit consents 22 mechanism been used is a conjectural matter, which only time will solve. The only thing that might be asserted in the field of probabilities is that if the exit consents had been resorted to, the number of holdouts would have been lower, as well as the number of potential disputes. Possible collection attempts by the holdouts will remain latent until Argentina reaches a satisfactory agreement with each of them. Besides, there are many elements that might be taken into account in connection with the level of acceptance, irrespective of the use-or notof the exit consents mechanism. Among other arguments, Argentina was the country that obtained the largest haircut, since, if a comparison is made between the seventy-five percent obtained in terms of par value (sixty-six percent net present value) against Ecuador's forty percent or Russia's thirty-six percent (Ukraine, Pakistan and Uruguay made no haircut). Argentina's haircut was much larger, and this could have discouraged participation by certain creditors, who opted to recover their claims through court actions. In addition, Argentina's debt restructuring was the most complex one in terms of number of series (152) and creditors (more than 700,000) scattered through various countries. It might be also argued that the absence of dialogue with creditors may have affected the level of participation. 23 Apart from the absence of dialogue with creditors, the international markets will not easily forget the Executive Branch's hostile attitude, even if it is used as a bargaining tool.
BANKHOLDERS' GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
Another issue that is noteworthy, in light of the attachments decreed in Brussels against the financial agents of the Republic of Peru and Nicaragua, is that in all the new bonds subject to New York and English law, the 22. Exit consent is a mechanism used in sovereign bond restructuring to enhance creditor participation. fiscal agent has been replaced with a trustee. 24 The difference lies in the fact that while a fiscal agent is an agent of the debtor (the sovereign), the trustee acts on behalf of the creditors. Regretfully, in the case of Argentina, this does not apply to those bonds that are subject to the Argentine law. The only logical explanation is that although certain Argentine courts have already ruled against the laws that declared an economic emergency and which are the legal basis of the whole crisis legislation, among which the rules that led to the restructuring are included, it is highly unlikely that the Argentine Supreme Court would rule against such laws if a suit is brought in Argentina. Despite the tools available to restructure sovereign debt (exit consents, term enhancers, etc.), the Argentine Government was unable to limit or reduce to a minimum the threat posed by the holdouts. The greater the amount of holdout creditors, the greater there is a possibility of being threatened in a court. Besides, additional debt was issued locally while in default, thus further extending the cure of the distressed situation. These factors impacted on the risk rating of future issues and also affect the debt rating assigned to private corporations.
As of December 31, 2001, Argentina's stock of debt was US$ 144.4 billion, while as of December 31, 2004, it was US$ 191.2 billion. Argentina experienced an increase of US$ 46.8 billion, equivalent to a variation of almost twenty-five percent in only three years. 25 This increase in the stock of debt occurred during a period of time where no principal or interest payments were made on the defaulted debt. Not only did Argentina fail to save the sums that were not repaid under the external debt, but it also increased its indebtedness, the costs that a debt exchange implies, and the amounts claimed in foreign courts (which are continuously updated). 26 In sum, as it has been stated, ' Apart from the outcome of the restructuring and the various opinions that might have risen, there are other facts that should not be left unmentioned. Although in the recent debt exchange Argentina has offered bonds with forty-two years tenure, it should be borne in mind that none of the major governments in Latin America has fully repaid a thirty-year bond. 28 Yet another significant aspect is that the debt/GDP ratio as of December 2001, was 62.4%, while after the exchange offer it stands at eightyeight percent, 29 despite the seventy-five percent haircut on the par value of the bonds. The debt/GDP ratio is used as an indicator of debt sustainability. An extensive study by Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano concluded that the debt/GDP ratio for Argentina-to be sustainableshould be fifteen percent. 30 In connection with the foregoing, the same study has concluded that default may become a way of living: The more it happens, the more it is probable that it will happen again, since the debtor has less to lose and is prone to defaulting again. 31 Argentina defaulted in 1982 during the Malvinas/Falklands affair, in 1990 when they achieved a Brady deal in 1992, and again in [2001] [2002] . 32 Since Argentina does not have a reputation of a country that serves its debt and abides by the rule of law, someone may wonder if it will default (or restructure) again in 2012, when its ten year cycle becomes due again. On the contrary, as to its reputation, it has been said that "Argentina emerged as the single most resistant debtor in international finance." 33 One cannot ignore that Argentina has been blessed during the last five years due to the liquidity abundance as result of the favorable global economic situation and the ever high price of commodities. 37 Although the core issue was not resolved, an order was issued by the court ordering Argentina to divulge information about government property outside the country that is used for commercial purposes: A discovery measure.
IV. THE ARGENTINE PROSPECTUS USED FOR THE EXCHANGE OFFER
The Argentine Prospectus Supplement used for the exchange offer included certain language that could be considered a common practice. Nevertheless, if this language is analyzed under the subsequent developments, it turns relevant. This section analyses such language. In its Prospectus Supplement, Argentina stressed its intentions vis-á-vis the holdouts under the heading 'Risk Factor'. Argentina expressly stated that:
Eligible Securities that are not tendered may remain in default indefinitely. Eligible Securities not exchanged pursuant to the Offer will remain outstanding. Argentina has announced that it has no intention of resuming payments on any Eligible Securities that remain outstanding following the expiration of the Offer. Consequently, if you elect not to tender your Eligible Securities pursuant to the Offer there can be no assurance that you will receive any future payments in respect of your Eligible Securities. If the Offer is completed, the trading market for any series of Eligible Securities not exchanged may become illiquid, which may adversely affect the market value of any Eligible Securities of such series. . . . 38 Although this can be understood as a common practice to discourage creditors from holding-out, special attention should be made to the wording. All the risks (the 'threats' posed by the sovereign) are not actual and are only potential. The language has been carefully chosen: 'May', 'no intention', 'can', etc. . . The only time that 'will' has been used, no clarification was made as to when: (1) 'Will remain outstanding' during the exchange offer? (2) 'Will remain outstanding' until the settlement date? (3) 'Will remain outstanding' during the first year after the settlement? (4) 'Will remain outstanding' until enough pressure from international organizations build up? Or, (5) 'will remain outstanding' forever? Since it is not clear what 'will' means, there is only a potential risk. Creditors 
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holding the bonds, however, would not care much because they already have a right to claim as result of the contractual breach resulting from the default. In any event, it will be reduced to a financial analysis as to what is the best option for its interests (including recovery chances). This does not pose any actual risk to trigger a breach of the pari passu clause included in the so-called old bonds.
Argentina was trying to reassure the participating creditors that the offer was the only possible choice and that there would not be a second opportunity. Therefore, Argentina decided to also strengthen this position by including a 'most favored' creditor clause. The analysis of this clause follows.
V. THE 'MOST FAVORED CREDITOR CLAUSE'
In anticipation of the potential problems that might arise with holdouts, the 'most favored creditor's clause' is a clause that was included in the Argentine Prospectus Supplement used for the exchange offer to settle the Argentine exchange offer. 39 This clause governs the treatment to be afforded to those creditors who accepted the debt exchange offer, in the event that after the exchange the Argentine Government decided to make a new exchange offer or otherwise improve the conditions offered to holdouts, in order to induce them to consent to and participate in the debt exchange. The aim of this clause is to prevent those who decided to participate in the exchange offer from suffering a loss in case of a subsequent improvement of the terms of the offer.
Since prior to the exchange offer there has been a big speculation around the amount of creditors that would finally participate, the Argentine Government decided to include this clause to prevent creditors from not taking part in the exchange offer due to the possibility of making an offer at a later stage to the holdout creditors with better terms and conditions. The Argentine Government expressly stated on several occasions (and particularly at the road show presentation of January 12, 2005 40 ), that it would not make a new offer after launching the debt exchange and that the 'most favored creditor clause' reaffirms the unique nature of the offer. This clause will be applicable until December 31, 2014. 41 The clause states that (emphasis added): 42 1. Argentina reserves the right-in its absolute discretion-to: (a) purchase; (b) exchange; (c) offer to purchase or exchange; or, (d) enter into a settlement in respect of any eligible securities that are not exchanged pursuant to the exchange offer. And-to the extent 2. Any such purchase, exchange, offer to purchase or exchange or settlement will be made in accordance with applicable law. 3. The terms of any such purchases, exchanges, offers or settlements could differ from the terms of the exchange offer. Therefore, 4. Holders of the new bonds will be entitled to participate in any voluntary purchase, exchange, offer to purchase or exchange extended to or agreed with holders of eligible securities not exchanged pursuant to the exchange offer [NOTE: the word settlement does not appear in this paragraph]. The Argentine Government-on many occasions but particularly in the exchange offer presentation, 43 expressly argued that there will not be any further exchange offers and that the 'most favored creditor clause' reinforces this. The rights granted to holders of the new bonds extends until December 31, 2014. 44 It is worth noticing that the clause refers to the possibility of 'settlements' with holders of the eligible securities (see 1, 2, and 3 above). But, curiously, in the last part of the clause where the rights of the creditors who decided to participate in the exchange offer are reinforced (see 4 above), the word 'settlement' is not included. This implies that it can be understood, unless it is challenged and resolved by a court on the contrary, that the Argentine Government can reach a settlement with a holdout creditor without triggering the applicability of this clause.
The Argentine Government enacted Presidential Decree 1735/04 on December 9, 2004. This decree included in its Annex I an English version of the latest draft of the Prospectus Supplement before being submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. In the last part of the 'most favored creditor clause,' as of that date, holders of the new securities were entitled to "participate in any voluntary purchase, exchange, offer to purchase or exchange or settlement extended to or agreed with holders of [e]ligible securities not exchanged," pursuant to the exchange offer. As of that date, the word 'settlement' was still included in the draft. 45 Therefore, the clause that was originally included to protect creditors' rights produced exactly the contrary. These type of amendments to a draft prospectus supplement, i.e. the elimination of a word in complex documents drafted by various highly qualified professionals and reviewed 43 by several experts, cannot be considered as an involuntarily omission. Due to a last-minute amendment, the clause that was intended to provide increased assurances to creditors finally produced exactly the contrary.
VI. LAW 26,017 ('PADLOCK LAW') AND THE IMF
In view of the potential ineffectiveness of the 'most favored creditor clause', the Argentine Government passed Law No. 26,017, 46 also known as the Padlock Law, which prevents the Argentine Executive Branch from reopening the exchange process or making any kind of court, outof-court or private transaction, or settlement with respect to the bonds subject to the exchange offer. This law intended to send a message to the creditors during the exchange process, the moment where the law was passed and promulgated, which assured creditors that their rights would not be breached. In other words, those that decide not to participate in the exchange offer (i.e. holdouts) would not have a second chance.
Although 51 Those reserves in excess of the monetary base and that are not used for support purposes are considered free reserves. 52 Central bank reserves and free reserves cannot be frozen or attached, and if they produce a neutral effect, they can be used to pay international financial institutions. 53 Using reserves of the Central Bank to pay the IMF is a common practice since sovereigns usually use their central banks (or the body performing those functions) as its financial agent. 54 The pre-payment implied the following accounting steps: (1) money was deducted from the assets column in the balance sheet of the Central Bank of Argentina (that was the reason Law 23,928 was amended by means of Decree 1599/05 and ratified by Law 26,076); and (2) the same amount was cancelled from the liabilities column (the Central Bank was instructed to pay the IMF according to Resolution 49/05 of the Ministry of Economy and Decree 1601/05). Nevertheless, this over simplistic exercise also implied that a credit in the same amount was written in the asset column, i.e., the debt 'owed' by the government to the central bank resulting from the payment which was performed on its behalf and was in- 58 In theory this was not much more than just an accounting exercise and since a payment was done, less money was available. Due to the financial situation of the government, however, it required a new issuance of debt at a higher interest rate. It is important to stress that the monies owed to the IMF were not due, and therefore there was no reason for a pre-payment other than a politically motivated decision. In order to materialize this payment, Argentina issued debt locally that was allocated to certain 55. In the case of Argentina, the obligation for repayment was instrumented by means of a debt title issued as per Joint Resolution Nos. This section will analyze the potential vulnerability of Argentina to a pari passu attack, i.e., a creditor initiating a claim against Argentina on the basis of the pari passu clause included in the debt instruments. For this purpose, it is necessary to analyze first why Argentina did not resort to the market-oriented established techniques to enhance participation of creditors by means of discouraging holdout creditors. These are: (1) the use of CACs; and (2) exit consent or exit amendments. Subsequently, the analysis of the particular case of Argentina and the risks that it faces visa-vis the enforcement of the pari passu clause will be analyzed. type of clauses that have been strongly pursued by the official sector and many academics, and they were effectively incorporated in bond issuances. Due to the scope of this article, special focus will be provided to these clauses. Majority action clauses enable the amendment of any of the terms and conditions of the bonds, including the payment terms, if the required majority therein established is obtained. The origin of these clauses under English law can be traced back to 1879, as the result that debtors facing liquidity problems were faced with one sole alternative: Liquidation. 66 In the United States, the use of majority action clauses in sovereign bonds was not widely accepted as in English law due to Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) 67 that expressly states that the amount due under a publicly-issued corporate bond cannot be affected without the consent of each bondholder (i.e. 100%) and provides that a deferment of a maximum of three years is acceptable upon the approval of seventy-five percent of the bondholders. 68 As noted by Buchheit and Gulati, "although the TIA is not applicable to foreign sovereign bonds issued in the US, the amendment clauses included in such sovereign bonds have almost invariably followed the TIA-driven approach to amendments." 69 In 2003, with the bond issuances of Mexico 70 and Brazil, 71 CACs were broadly incorporated in sovereign bonds issued under New York law. The path set forth by Mexico and Brazil was rapidly followed by Belize, Egypt, Korea, Lebanon, Qatar, South Africa, and many more thereafter. 80 ) and to a certain extent-as in the case of the pari passu clause-by inadvertence. 81 Additionally, also in 2003, Uruguay re-profiled all of its outstanding sovereign debt and included CACs in the terms of the new bonds. This means that future debt restructuring can be performed in an orderly manner by just tendering the votes of the bondholders without having to resort to an exchange offer. Moreover, this would eliminate the problem of the holdouts since an agreeing majority would bind all the dissenting creditors. 82 So far, the required threshold to amend the terms of the bonds containing CACs has been seventy-five percent in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding bonds (e.g. Egypt, Lebanon, Mexico, Qatar, Uruguay, etc). Brazil has been the only case where an eighty-five percent rate has been required.
Uruguay is a unique case since by way of an aggregation mechanism, amendments to any terms (including payment terms) can be incorporated to one or more series of bonds simultaneously. In order to approve an amendment applicable to two or more series, a double majority is required: (1) eighty percent of the aggregate principal amount of all affected series; and (2) Unfortunately, the Argentine bonds subject to New York law did not include CACs, and in the case of those subject to English law, the Argentine government feared the possibility of having to face a blocking holding, which is what happened in the case of the use of exit consent. 84 The analysis on the use of exit consent as a restructuring technique and the threat of blocking holdings is explained below.
B. EXIT CONSENT
Exit consent is the technique by which holders of bonds in default which have accepted an exchange offer-at the moment of accepting said offer-grant their consent to amend certain terms of the bonds to be restructured. By using the exit consent technique, the exchange offer is conditioned to a minimum threshold of creditors' acceptance and the amendments to the terms are performed once the required majority has been obtained.
By means of these amendments, the defaulted bonds subject to the exchange offer are less attractive (in legal and financial terms), forcing a greater number of bondholders to accept the exchange offer. Otherwise, if bondholders do not accept the exchange offer, they will be holding an impaired bond lacking some of the original contractual enhancements.
Due to the extensive time elapsed since the announcement of the moratorium and the implementation of the exchange offer, Argentina could not make an exchange proposal by availing itself of the use of exit conthe date of payment; reduce the principal amount or redemption price or premium; reduce the portion of the principal amount which is payable in the event of an acceleration; reduce the interest rate; change the currency or place of payment of any amount payable; change the obligation to pay additional amounts; change the definition of 'outstanding' or the percentage of votes required for the taking of any action; authorize the trustee to exchange or substitute all the debt securities or convert all the debt securities into other obligations; or change the pari passu ranking, governing law, submission to jurisdiction or waiver of immunities provisions)] . . . Any reserve matter modification to the terms and conditions of the debt securities of a single series, or to the indenture insofar as it affects the debt securities of a single series, may generally be made, and future compliance therewith may be waived, with the consent of Uruguay and the holders of not less than seventy-five percent in aggregate principal amount of the debt securities of such series at the time outstanding. If Uruguay proposes any reserve matter modification to the terms and conditions of the debt securities of two or more series, or to the indenture insofar as it affects the debt securities of two or more series, in either case as such modifications may be made, and future compliance therewith may be waived, for any affected series if made with the consent of Uruguay and: the holders of not less than eighty-five percent in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt securities of all series that would be affected by that reserve matter modification (taken in aggregate), and the holders of not less than 66-2/3% in aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt securities of that series (taken individually 85 The reason for this was that the delay in the implementation of the debt restructuring by Argentina resulted in the alignment of those bondholders who opposed the restructuring and held sufficient majority for preventing an amendment to the terms and conditions of the defaulted bonds ('blocking holdings'). This did not permit Argentina to make an exchange offer using a combined mechanism with the use of exit consents. Hence, Argentina lost the chance to use the mechanism that would have lessened the holdout problem discouraging the non-accepting creditors without affecting the payment terms, provided that the required percentage to amend the terms and conditions of the prospectus was obtained. Plaintiffs' ex parte motion for a preliminary injunction is based on their incorrect speculation that the Republic's as-yet unannounced Exchange Offer will contain 'exit consents' that will somehow inflict irreparable harm upon them. Of course had plaintiffs simply waited until the November 29 launch of the Exchange Offer (which is not scheduled to close until 2005) they would have learned what the Republic has publicly confirmed: the Exchange Offer will not include exit consents. 88 Had it resorted to the exit consents mechanism, Argentina would have been able to increase the number of participants by amending the exchange offer terms (without changing the payment conditions); therefore dispiriting those who had decided not to participate. 89 Ecuador and Uruguay made use of the exit consents and obtained ninety-seven percent and ninety-three percent participation, respectively. Ukraine, which used a mechanism similar to the exit consents that included the grant of irrevo- The use of exit consents and CACs have curtailed to certain extent the power of holdouts in a sovereign debt restructuring. In addition, the use of a trust structures, particularly with the features of Grenada's issuance in 2005 and subject to New York law, does not provide individual enforcement rights for bondholders (i.e. all enforcement rights vest only with the trustee and may be exercised solely for the ratable benefit of all bondholders only if a demand is made by holders of at least twenty-five percent of the outstanding amount of the bonds). 90 
VIII. THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE AFTER THE ARGENTINA SAGA: THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS
Without having the possibility of using CACs or exit consents, Argentina had run out of options to enhance creditor participation. The only option left was to creatively use the terms of the bonds. Therefore, upon a desperate situation, Argentina resorted to a desperate measure. By passing Law 26,017, Argentina was trying to reassure participating creditors that the offer was the only possible choice. However, something that seemed so simple (like passing a law to gain credibility and leave in the past the blunder with the wording of the 'most favored creditor' clause of the prospectus) might be the center stage for a potential pari passu attack.
Argentina made it clear that there was no intention of resuming any payments to the holdouts, which can be implied from both the formal prohibition of any further transactions included in the Padlock Law and the wording under the 'Risk Factors' section in the Prospectus Supplement. The combination of these two factors, however, could result in a formal subordination of the bonds held by those that decided not to participate in the exchange offer.
Subordination, as defined in the Black's Law Dictionary, is "the act or an instance of moving something (such as the right or claim) to a lower rank, class or position." 91 As noted in In re Enron Corp., the "[s]ubordination of a claim alters the otherwise applicable priority of that claim within a creditor class; a subordinated claim receives a distribution only after the claims of other creditors have been satisfied." 92 Subordination is a common feature in debt financing. As noted by Schnebel, "when there are two are more creditors of a common borrower, conflicts will invariably exist." 93 This is the reason why inter-creditor agreements, i.e. agreements to rule the relationship among creditors of a same owner, have developed and, in certain complex financial structures, become very common (e.g. when mezzanine debt is used).
In the process of providing various financing sources, the debtor and its creditors will try to set an order of priority in the event that something goes wrong. This gave rise to various types of corporate debt financing with different priority ranks based on the risk/return trade-off, 94 e.g. (in order of priority) senior debt, second lien, mezzanine finance, high yield debt, payment-in-kind notes, shareholders loans, and equity.
The priority of claims becomes relevant upon a state of insolvency (in the case of corporations) or default (in the case of sovereigns). 95 In the case of insolvency, section 726 of the US Bankruptcy Code 96 describes the priority of claims, with the exception of allowed secured claims that are satisfied by or from the collateral. 97 The exception to the general system of priorities is contemplated under Section 510 of the US Bankruptcy Code, 98 which provides for the subordination of claims on a contractual or consensual basis (Section 510(a)), or an equitable basis (Section 510(c)). In the same line, the Uniform Commercial Code 99 authorizes subordination under Section 1-209 and in regard to the priority of liens, under Section 9-316. The UCC allows for the alteration of statutory priorities by means of an agreement. Besides these two types of subordination (contractual and equitable), there is also a third type, i.e. legal subordination. Priorities and equitable and legal subordinations are limited by law, while a contractual subordination is the right of a creditor to subordinate the totality or a part of its credit to other creditors.
The contractual or consensual subordination is the most common type of subordination and requires the consent of the creditor that will subordinate itself to other creditors. Usually, the consent is granted by means of a written agreement between the debtor and the creditor. In certain cases, it could also be performed by means of an agreement between creditors. A contractual subordination is governed by general con- tract law and therefore should comply with the usual requirements of a contract (agreement, consideration, capacity, etc.). Although obvious, it is important to stress that a characteristic element of a subordination agreement is that the contracting party decides to subordinate itself, and consequently, others benefit from this action. Equitable subordination is a type of subordination imposed by the courts based on the force of law for reasons of equity and fairness rather than a contractual agreement. 100 It is an exceptional measure and must meet three requisites: (1) a creditor is engaged in an inequitable conduct; (2) the misconduct injured the other creditors or resulted in unfair advantage; and (3) equitable subordination is not inconsistent with provisions of the US Bankruptcy Code. 101 As clearly stated in In re EMB Associates, Inc., the "[f]undamental aim of equitable subordination under Bankruptcy Code is to undo or offset any inequity in claimed position of a creditor that will produce injustice or unfairness to other creditors in terms of bankruptcy results." 102 The trustee, the debtor, the creditors, or the court can compel the equitable subordination. 103 Examples of conduct that has justified equitable subordination include: fraud, illegality, breach of fiduciary duties, undercapitalization, and claimant's use of debtor as mere instrumentality or alter ego. 104 Wood argues that equitable subordination occurs as the result of the misconduct of the creditor. 105 Legal subordination derives from the law, e.g. Section 510(b) or Section 747 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 106 The pre-existent general rule provides that in certain situations, the claim will be subordinated. These pre-existent rules are known to all the parties prior to entering in a transaction or situation that might result in the subordination of a claim. It is important to mention that subordination only affects the priority of payment and not the right of payment. 107 United States domestic corporate bonds do not include a pari passu clause because there is no need to do so. Why? Priorities are well established by law and a creditor cannot be subordinated to another creditor within the same category unless consent is provided (contractual subordination) or by statute (legal subordination or equitable subordination). 108 As noted by Hagan, the pari passu clause in sovereign debt has generally been understood to limit the legal subordination of debt. 109 In this same sense, The New York Clearing House Association L.L.C. (an association of some of the largest U.S. commercial banks) stated that pari passu clauses apply to protect creditors against legal subordination to other unsecured obligations of the debtor and eventually to provide certainty in the event of involuntarily subordination. 110 Although it is fairly straightforward to obtain a favorable judgment, enforcing it is a completely different matter. Although the litigator's imagination has no boundaries, a sovereign does not have many attachable assets abroad. Even the few assets that are located abroad generally receive certain types of immunity. Therefore, unless certain exceptional circumstances, apply a bondholder of a sovereign state would be better off participating in a restructuring arrangement where it can have certain leverage as a group. And, here is precisely where it is relevant for holdouts to try to invoke a breach of the pari passu clause. If that is the case, it will increase their chances to collect.
Going back to the Argentine analysis, it can be argued that holdouts were provided with the same exchange offer that the participating creditors were provided, and were also advised of the possible outcome in the event of refusing the exchange offer. Following this line of thinking, assuming arguendo it can be claimed that holdout creditors subordinated themselves intentionally in order to trigger the pari passu clause: Subordination as a result of a 'no' action. In addition, it can be stated that although the Padlock Law 'locked' the exchange offer, it did not affect the holdouts since by not accepting the exchange offer holdout creditors waved their right in the first place. Besides, holdouts creditors can still resort to litigation to collect on their non-performing bond based on the breach of contract as result of the default. The holdout creditor has two related although distinctive rights: (1) the right to accept (or reject) an exchange offer; and (2) to recover its credit invoking a breach of the pari passu clause. They are related because the common feature is the bond and its terms (prospectus and prospectus supplement), but they are different since they derive from different actions of the sovereign: (1) an exchange offer made by the sovereign that gives the right to those holding the debt instrument to accept it or reject it; and (2) the breach of the pari passu clause as result of an alteration in the ranking of claims within the same category of creditors. Waiving the former (the right to enter the exchange offer) shall not infringe or have any influence on the latter.
The party that voluntarily enters into a contract to subordinate its claim makes an express demonstration of its will of not being equal to other creditors in its same standing at the moment of payment (in the event of liquidation). The creditor that enters into a subordination agreement relinquishes its pari passu right. Therefore, priority and subordination are exceptions to the pari passu principle.
The holdouts did not waive their pari passu right; on the contrary-and continuing with the assuming arguendo-it can be said that other creditors altered the status of the holdouts by exchanging their debt instruments for a new 'performing' instrument. If it could be claimed that the holdout creditors subordinated themselves by a 'no' action, it can also be argued that the participating bondholders in the exchange offer subordinated the holdouts. None of the arguendo scenarios ('no' action subordination or the subordination of the holdouts as result of the exchange offer) should cause any effect on the holdouts. In the case of Argentina, however, the holdouts are different. Argentina expressly stated that the bonds of the holdout creditors will remain 'non-performing.' Argentina then passed a law by which the exchange offer was locked, indirectly granting a legal priority to those creditors that entered the exchange offer.
As noted by Tudor, 111 Buchheit, Pam, and the Financial Markets Law Committee, 112 the pari passu clause was originally intended: (1) to prevent the earmarking of revenues of the government towards a single creditor; (2) against legal measures which have the effect of preferring one set of creditors against the others (e.g. enacting a specific norm); and/or, (3) against legal measures which discriminate between creditors creating an involuntary subordination.
The earmarking of revenues has been curtailed by an expanded nega- The Argentine Padlock Law can be interpreted as falling within 2 above, i.e. a legal measure preferring one set of creditors against the others, which was already addressed in the Libra Bank Limited v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica S.A. 115 and Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agrícola de Cartago. 116 In Libra, the plaintiffs (seven banks 117 ) brought an action to recover their share of principal amounts, plus interest, of a Forty Million US$ syndicated loan to Banco Nacional de Costa Rica (Banco Nacional). Banco Nacional was the defendant, a banking concern wholly owned by the Costa Rican government that defaulted on the payments due under the loan agreement. As its sole defense, Banco Nacional asserted that it was barred from making any repayment by an act of the Costa Rican government-a resolution from the Central Bank of Costa Rica and an 113. The inclusion of expanded negative pledge clauses was the market reaction to action initiated by Citibank against Export-Import Bank of the United States, which in the end was settled by the parties. Executive Decree-and that the court is barred from entering decision by the act of state doctrine. In Allied, Allied Bank International acted as the agent for thirty-nine creditor banks to recover on promissory notes issued by Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, Banco Anglo Costarricense and Banco Nacional. These three Costa Rican banks, the defendants, are wholly owned by the Republic of Costa Rica and subject to the direct control of the Central Bank of Costa Rica. While the action was still pending before the District Court, the parties reached a rescheduling agreement and dismissed the claim in July 1982. In September 1983, a refinancing agreement was executed. Fidelity Union Trust Company of New Jersey, one of the members of the Allied syndicate, did not accept the agreement and was the one who managed to obtain a rehearing before the Court of Appeals, which vacated its previous decision and overturned the District Court's decision.
The banking laws of Costa Rica at that time provided that foreign state transactions had to be authorized by the Central Bank of Costa Rica. The Costa Rican Central Bank's resolution was adopted on August 27, 1981, to remedy Costa Rica's problems in servicing its external debts (debts to foreign creditors in foreign currency), providing that only repayments of external debts to multilateral international agencies would be authorized. Subsequently, on November 24, 1981, a decree was enacted prohibiting payment of principal or interest on external debt in foreign currency without the prior approval of the Central Bank in consultation with the Minister of Finance. This decree was applicable to all public sector entities. The Costa Rican Central Bank subsequently refused to authorize any foreign debt payments in U.S. dollars, thus precluding payment on the loan and the notes.
In both cases, the courts were faced with the question of whether the act of state doctrine barred them from entering a decision. It is worthy noticing that both the loan and the notes were payable in U.S. dollars in New York and subject to New York law (similar to the Argentine bonds held by some of the holdouts). 118 The Libra case has been very clear as to the validity of the claim of the act of state doctrine resulting from the enactment of a norm by a foreign state which affects a debt instrument not considered to be 'located' with a foreign state. The court resorted to Menendez v. Saks, where it was stated that '[f]or purposes of the act of state doctrine, a debt is not 'located' within a foreign state unless that state has the power to enforce or collect it." 119 It is important to note that the loan was issued in U.S. dol-118. It is difficult to assert if all the debt instruments held by the holdouts have the same features since there were 152 series, subject to eight different laws and denominated in seven currencies (originally fourteen but resulted in seven due to the adoption of the EUR 122 Under the traditional application of the act of state doctrine, the principle of judicial refusal of examination of sovereign's acts applies only to a taking by a foreign sovereign of property within its own territory. 123 When the property is within the US at the time of the attempted confiscation (situs of the debt), however, US courts will only give effect to the foreign state acts of state if they are consistent with the policy and law of the US. 124 Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that:
[ IT'S MONSTROUS, it's a scandal, nothing like this has happened before! From now on no-one in his right mind will specify New York law and New York as a place of litigation in a loan agreement. 130 The situs of the debt was New York and, hence, the act of state doctrine did not preclude the courts inquiring into the validity of the Costa Rican foreign currency decree despite the fact that it was enacted upon an emergency situation and granting a legal priority to multilateral international agencies, which already enjoy an ad-hoc priority. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Argentine Padlock Law can also be questioned by U.S. courts since the act of state doctrine would not apply. 131 The most authoritative arguments against the discrimination by the lender where made by Buchheit on three different occasions (one jointly with Walker). This author clearly stated that the purpose of the pari passu clause is to prevent the creation of a preferred creditor:
A pari passu covenant will, however, restrict the borrower from subordinating in a formal way the debt being incurred (or restructured) pursuant to the agreement containing this clause in favor of some 126 other external obligation. 132 [I]f a sovereign borrower intends as a practical matter to discriminate among its creditors in terms of payments, the pari passu undertaking will at least prevent the sovereign from attempting to legitimize the discrimination by enacting laws or decrees which purport to bestow a senior status on certain indebtedness or give a legal preference to certain creditors over others. . . 133 The purpose of the pari passu clause is to ensure that the borrower does not have, nor will it subsequently create, a class of creditors whose claims against the borrower will rank legally senior to the indebtedness represented by the loan agreement. 134 The Padlock Law provided a basis for considering an alteration in the legal ranking of the existing unsecured creditors resulting in the involuntary subordination of the holdouts by means of the positive action by other lenders ratified by law. The relevant issue is the Padlock Law, a legal measure adopted by the Argentine government. The arguendo actions or 'no' actions are irrelevant because without the Padlock Law there is no subordination. In all, it is obvious that Argentina's ultimate purpose by passing the Padlock Law was to regain the confidence of the majority participating creditors and to achieve a more successful restructuring of its debt (not with the intention of giving a legal preference to the participating creditors over the holdouts). When applied to inter-creditor proceedings, the established legal principle of pari passu provides that all participants comprising a class of creditors shall be entitled to participate equally in stature and without preference. As discussed previously, the obligation imposed on a sovereign debtor under the ranking interpretation of the pari passu clause was generally to prevent sovereigns from adopting legal measures which have the effect of preferring one set of creditors against the others. Unfortunately, disregarding the consequence of such formal legislative action, Argentina then made itself more vulnerable; a legal subordination of the holdout creditors was formally made that might give rise to a breach of the pari passu clause. As a result, the holdouts can meet their end by resorting to litigation in the hope of obtaining a better outcome than that of the exchange offer.
Moreover, Articles 4 and 6 of the Padlock Law take positive actions towards the alteration of the rights of the holdouts. Article 4 instructs the executive branch to adopt all the necessary actions to delist the bonds. Article 6 states that all bonds deposited that are part of a claim and where presented before a judge to collect will be de facto converted into Par
Step-up Bonds due in 2038. 135 In Greek mythology, Sisyphus was a competent and astute king of Corinth who was considered capable of challenging even the Gods. Sisyphus, however, had angered the Gods so much that they condemned him to the task of eternally pushing a rock up a mountain. Upon Sisyphus' arrival at the summit of the mountain, his load-the rock-rolled along the slope by which he had just ascended. Sisyphus had to return to the base of the mountain again and again to repeat his useless efforts. Albert Camus analyzed the myth of Sisyphus and stated that the Gods had thought that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labor. 136 Argentina's situation might be that of Sisyphus-futile and hopeless-if a solution is not found to deal with the holdouts.
In In re Pinnacle Brands, Inc., it was stated that "[w]hile bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, have the power to equitably subordinate claims, there is no statutory provision permitting bankruptcy courts to elevate the priority of an existing claim." 137 The same should apply to a sovereign as well. This is precisely why Argentina might face litigation as result of the breach of the pari passu clause on valid grounds and not based on a wrongful interpretation of the pari passu clause.
In summary, it can be said that the pari passu clause mistakenly migrated from secured private lending to unsecured sovereign lending. Once rooted in unsecured sovereign lending instruments it faced provisions like the ones in Spain or the Philippines and become a 'must have' provision in this type of debt instrument. Then, pari passu clauses stayed in place out of fear of earmarking revenues and the risk that the sovereign preferred one group of creditors over another. These fears, however, were tackled by an expanded negative pledge clause and the Libra and Allied cases. Therefore, if a proper due diligence was conducted there was no need to have a pari passu clause except in exceptional circumstances like the ones in Spain or the Philippines. Unfortunately, a misguided interpretation of the pari passu clause in the Elliot case opened the door to litigation on unjust grounds (payment interpretation or broad interpretation of the pari passu clause). It was an 'aberration,' 138 but one that caused furor. The problem was that in Elliot there was no breach of the pari passu clause, just a wrong understanding of its meaning. In the case of Argentina, the whole story is different because the language can be correctly interpreted as a breach of the pari passu clause in its ranking or narrow form. The importance of this article lies precisely in explaining the different interpretations of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt 135 IX. SOME FINAL CONSIDERATIONS Usually, an exchange offer has a termination date, a date until which bondholders can exchange their 'defaulted' old bonds for new bonds. Another feature is the possibility of leaving the exchange offer open for those creditors that did not participate. The non participation of bondholders does not necessarily means that they decided to holdout, it can mean that bondholders were not aware of the exchange offer. 139 Therefore, it would be convenient and in good faith to leave the exchange offer open for those creditors that are willing to join the exchange offer after closure. This might pose a threatening speculative dilemma to the sovereign, because bondholders would not enter the restructuring and would wait to see the participation degree. For that reason, the announcement of this feature should be performed once the required majority or the desired threshold by the sovereign has been achieved.
In this respect, it is important to note that Argentina not only closed the exchange offer tendering period but also 'locked-it' by passing the socalled Padlock Law. The fact that Argentina passed Law 26,017 prohibiting future offers to the holdout creditors could be interpreted as a formal subordination of creditors. The fact that these creditors where subordinated could be interpreted as a violation of the pari passu clause. Thus, holdout creditors affected as the result of this possible subordination might have a right to claim a breach of the pari passu clause. As Buchheit has noted, "you can do pretty much whatever you want in discriminating among creditors (in terms of who gets paid and who does not) but do not try to justify your behavior by taking steps that purport to establish a legal basis for discrimination." 140 Following this line of thinking, another relevant fact of the Argentine saga that could also be considered as discrimination to bondholders is the fact that the Argentine government offered more favorable terms to the Argentine pension funds. 141 The more favorable terms were represented in certain accounting benefits granted to Argentine pension funds. Therefore, the net present value of the exchange offer was not the same to the Argentine pension funds than to other creditors. The rationale behind this measure was to ensure the participation of the pension funds in the restructuring since they held approximately twenty percent of the defaulted debt. This might not only affect the pari passu clause but also the non-discriminatory treatment of foreign nationals and foreign financial institutions (i.e. the principle of 'national treatment') under WTO-GATS 142 principles.
All these potential threats could have been avoided in first place by not including a pari passu clause in the debt instruments. Could the inclusion of a pari passu clause have been avoided? The answer would be 'yes' except in the cases of Spain and the Philippines' debt instruments (and any other jurisdiction that allows the creditors to create post-issuance preferences).
It can be said that the pari passu clause mistakenly migrated from secured private lending to unsecured sovereign lending. Once rooted in unsecured sovereign lending instruments, it faced certain provisions like those of Spain or the Philippines that allow the creditor to create an expost priority. For that reason, the pari passu clause had a raison d'être and become a popular provision in this type of debt instrument. Then, pari passu clauses stayed in unsecured debt instruments due to other the fears: (1) the earmarking revenues or (2) the risk of the sovereign preferring a group of creditors over another. These two fears were tackled by an expanded negative pledge clause and the Libra and Allied cases, respectively. Therefore, if a proper due diligence was conducted there was no need to have a pari passu clause unless in limited exceptional circumstances. A misguided interpretation of the pari passu clause opened the door to litigation on incorrect grounds. In Argentina's case, however, the whole story could be correctly interpreted as a breach of the pari passu clause in its ranking or narrow form. If the Padlock Law is interpreted as a sovereign creating a priority in favor of certain creditors against others (resulting in an involuntary subordination of a group of creditors), despite the fact that it is already recognized in legal precedents, the pari passu clause will perpetuate in unsecured sovereign debt instruments.
